



# IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOOD ESTATE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA IN RIARIA VILLAGE, HUMBANG HASUNDUTAN REGENCY

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## Article Info

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## ABSTRACT

Food Estate is not a new term in Indonesia. Food Estate is a policy made by the government to maintain the stability and food security of the country during the food crisis that emerged when the Covid-19 Pandemic emerged. This paper aims to analyze the implementation pattern of the Food Estate policy in Riaria Village, Humbang Hasundutan Regency and its impact on the social, economic and political aspects of the local farming community. The study used a qualitative approach with a descriptive method. Data were collected through in-depth interviews with key informants, field observations and analysis of policy documents. The Food Estate policy is top-down and does not involve the participation of the community and local farmers. The government determines commodities such as shallots and potatoes that are not in accordance with local agricultural habits such as andaliman, frankincense, and coffee, which causes crop failure and economic losses. Labor restructuring, which disrupts gender roles and household food security, is an example of a social impact. Politically, this policy triggers agrarian conflicts and strengthens the power relations between the government, corporations, and farmers. The principles of food sovereignty and community participation are often ignored when the Food Estate is implemented in Ria-Ria Village. This policy increases farmers' dependence on corporations and endangers the local agricultural system. Strengthening farmer institutions, bottom-up approaches, and increasing transparency are some of the policy recommendations.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

Food Estate is not a new term in Indonesian government policy. It is a policy of the Republic of Indonesia to maintain stable food security in the face of the post-COVID-19 food crisis. A case study of the Food Estate project in Central Kalimantan Province has yielded numerous problems, such as land clearing that led to recurring forest fires on peatlands. Furthermore, a closer look at the policy products also reveals overlapping regulations, such as Ministerial Regulation No. 24 of 2020, which regulates the use of forest areas for Food Estate development, which contradicts Law No. 41 of 1999, which regulates the limited use of protected forests for area utilization, environmental services, and the collection of non-timber forest products (Gambut, 2022).

Furthermore, the Food Estate issue in Central Kalimantan has also given rise to ongoing and unresolved tenurial issues, labor supply issues for the Food Estate program, the exclusion of local communities and farmers, resulting in the loss of land management rights for food and living space for local communities, and the use of a top-down policy implementation model. Furthermore, there are issues with rice productivity on peatlands, corn fields being converted to cassava fields, and issues with transparency and accuracy of information regarding the location and extent of rice fields, which have been unclear and unclear from the outset. Therefore, due to these problematic phenomena, the Food Estate in Central Kalimantan Province has generated numerous problems (Arjena Nayunda Risdianto, 2024). Similarly, the Food Estate in North Sumatra Province, located in Riaria Village, Pollung District, Humbang Hasundutan Regency, will be further examined in this study. However, first, we need to examine the historical context of the Food Estate project policy in Indonesia, which has been in place for a very long time and has experienced a period of hiatus.

The Food Estate project is not a new initiative aimed at achieving food security. Historically, the Food State program was implemented during the New Order era under Soeharto, and became the forerunner to the ongoing Food Estate program to this day. During the Soeharto administration, this policy was called the "One Million Hectares Peatland Project" in Central Kalimantan which was implemented in 1995-1998, this project aimed to convert peatlands into giant rice fields to achieve rice self-sufficiency, but this project was deemed a failure due to errors in peatland ecosystem management which caused forest fires and damaged the environment, in addition to inadequate technology to overcome the acidity and subsidence or lowering of the peatland surface and in the end this project was abandoned during the monetary crisis in 1998 and became the graveyard of the New Order Project. (Bank, 2009)

After the collapse of the New Order, the Food Estate Project was temporarily suspended and then restarted during the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration under the name "Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE)." It ran from 2010 to 2014 and was claimed to be the "Food Barn of Asia." Located in Merauke, Papua Province, it aimed to create rice paddies for food security and rice self-sufficiency. However, it ultimately morphed into a palm oil and sugarcane plantation project, successfully sacrificing customary land in Merauke and changing the food culture of the local Merauke community. (R. Yando Zakaria, 2011). The MIFEE policy was also implemented with minimal food technology research, a lack of thorough planning, and minimal community participation and government synergy with local communities and farmers. (Alsafana Rasman, 2023).

During the Joko Widodo administration, the Food Estate was prioritized to become one of the National Strategic Projects in 2015 and began its more massive implementation in 2020 through Presidential Regulation No. 18 of 2020 concerning the RPJMN (National Medium-Long Term Development Plan) 2020-2024 and Presidential Regulation No. 109 of 2020 concerning the Acceleration of the Implementation of National Strategic Projects, one of which is the Food Estate project as one of the National Strategic Projects of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia. This Presidential Policy was then also strengthened and supported by the Decree of the Minister of Agriculture No. 472 / KPTS / RC.040 / 6/2018 which determined the location of the national agricultural area, one of the locations chosen for the Food Estate area was Humbang Hasundutan Regency which was focused on planting horticultural crops such as Shallots and Coffee. This study focuses on the implementation pattern of the Food Estate in North Sumatra, which is a new location in the history of the project. North Sumatra is considered a center for the development of horticultural crops. This project differs from previous Food Estate practices, where the primary commodity crop was rice. Minister of Agriculture Syahrul Yasin Limpo selected Humbang Hasundutan Regency as the pilot location for the North Sumatra Food Estate in a meeting with Minister of Maritime Affairs and Investment Luhut Binsar Panjaitan (Indonesia, 2022).

The Ministry of Environment and Forestry then issued a decree through Ministerial Decree No. P.24/MENLHK/SETJEN/KUM.1/10/2020 of 2020, which stipulated the provision of forest areas for the North Sumatra Food Estate. Subsequently, the Ministry of Agriculture assumed responsibility for the North Sumatra Food Estate for the 2020 fiscal year. This transition continued into 2021, with the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment shifting its implementation to the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment. The Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment then issued Letter No. B-1856/Menko/Marves/AJ.00/IV/2021 from the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment, which instructed and appointed the Regent of Humbang Hasundutan as the Person in Charge of the Food Estate Project implementation in the area. (Indonesia, 2022)

This research examines and highlights the regulations and examines the implementation pattern of the Food Estate Project policy in Riaria Village and its impacts. Furthermore, it examines the extent to which the Food Estate project impacts the farming community and local communities involved. Therefore, it is important to question the instructions of the President and the ministers involved, and the researcher attempts to analyze the implementation pattern of the policy and whether it involves the participation of

farmers and local communities. This research question stems from a statement made by the Head of Riaria Village, Jon Perdianus Lumbangaol, during an interview. He explained that since the Food Estate's arrival in Riaria Village, there has been a lack of communication and coordination with him, and the Food Estate's socialization has not been carried out thoroughly and comprehensively with the community, resulting in inadequate education for local farmers. This is due to differences in planting culture within the Riaria Village community and the government's desired yield targets. The Riaria Village community has traditionally cultivated Andaliman, frankincense, corn, and potatoes, inherited from their ancestors. Then, the government decided to use Humbang Hasundutan as a planting location for horticultural crops such as shallots and granola potatoes. The community was not involved in determining which crops would be planted without prior communication and coordination.

This case study in Riaria Village, Humbang Hasundutan Regency, the initial location for the Food Estate implementation in North Sumatra, was the reason for this research, not only to examine the policy implementation pattern but also to assess the impact of the Food Estate implementation on the lives of the community and local farmers in Riaria Village. This reflects the impacts experienced during Food Estate implementation in Merauke, Papua, and Central Kalimantan. Identifying the impact of the Food Estate is crucial for assessing the future sustainability of the Food Estate project. The implementation of the Food Estate through a fast process and top-down pattern as applied in Papua and Central Kalimantan, is feared to ignore the participation of local communities and farmers.

## 2. RESEARCH METHOD

This study used a qualitative approach combined with a descriptive approach. In addition to field observations and comprehensive interviews with local farmers, community organizations, and village heads, data were collected through policy document analysis. The data analysis technique used a data condensation, presentation, and conclusion model. The focus of this study was the Van Meter and Van Horn policy implementation theory (Donal Van Meter, 1975). The theory shows six variables in policy implementation, including: policy standards and objectives, resources, implementing agent characteristics, inter-organizational communication and implementing activities, social, economic, and political conditions, and the disposition of implementers' attitudes. The data collected were in the form of direct interviews in the form of words or indirect interviews in the form of text, observations conducted by researchers obtained directly from informants or research sources which were then recorded in textual minutes. Primary data were scripts obtained through in-depth interviews with informants or sources as well as direct observations seen by researchers. Secondary data in this study were obtained from various sources, including journal literature, government documents, online and print publications that have a connection or relevance to this study.

## 3. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The Food Estate Project in Humbang Hasundutan Regency, particularly in Riaria Village, is a clear example of how agricultural development policies are implemented top-down with minimal community participation. This approach not only results in a mismatch with local needs but also has the potential to perpetuate unfair power relations between the government, corporations, and farmers. The Food Estate Policy in Humbang Hasundutan is characterized by centralized planning. The Food Estate Project initiative originated from the central government, with the project initiated by the central government through a collaborative effort between the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment, and the Ministry of Environment and Forestry in response to the threat of a global food crisis, without in-depth analysis of local conditions.

Furthermore, the determination of crop commodities was also carried out unilaterally without involving the participation of local communities and farmers. The types of crops, such as potatoes, shallots, and garlic, were determined by the government and corporations, not based on the traditional tradition of "pembantu haminjon" (a traditional Indonesian word for "pembantu haminjon") or the expertise of local farmers who are more familiar with rice, andaliman, and frankincense. Furthermore, the project was launched without a transparent planning document or master plan, leaving the community unaware of its long-term objectives, budget allocation, or evaluation mechanisms. Another problem is the lack of involvement and engagement of local communities and farmers through comprehensive and transparent outreach. While outreach activities are formal, the process is more one-sided (farmers are simply informed) than participatory consultation or farmer involvement in decision-making regarding the Food Estate project.

There is also no objection mechanism. Farmers are not given the option to reject the project or propose alternatives. They are simply directed to follow the established scheme without being given any say in their own village.

Decision-making in the Humbang Hasundutan Food Estate Project is apparently dominated by corporations. Corporations play a stronger role than farmers. For example, companies like Indofood, Ewindo, and Parna Raya are involved from the outset in determining the business model (closed-loop), while farmers are merely placed as implementers and workers. Furthermore, unequal contracts force farmers to sign agreements with corporations without fully understanding their terms, including pricing and profit-sharing clauses that are disadvantageous to them.

The lack of community involvement in the planning and implementation of the Food Estate has led to several serious problems, such as a mismatch with local needs. Riaria farmers lacked experience growing potatoes or garlic, resulting in many crop failures. Meanwhile, traditional crops like andaliman and frankincense were neglected because labor was diverted to the Food Estate. Furthermore, rather than improving food security, this project actually reduced local rice production because farmers were busy managing the Food Estate land. Furthermore, the policy implementation pattern weakened farmer autonomy in Riaria Village. Although the land remained legally owned by farmers, control over its use was taken over by corporations through contract schemes. Farmers no longer had the freedom to choose their own crops or planting patterns. Farmers were also forced to use seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides from partner companies, which were often unaffordable and left them in debt.

Analyzing the policy implementation theory of Van Meter and Van Horn, Van Meter and Van Horn's theory emphasizes six key factors influencing the success or failure of policy implementation. (Donal Van Metter, 1975) Elaborating and analyzing the Food Estate policy in Ria-Ria Village, Humbang Hasundutan Regency, we find that:

#### *Policy Standards and Objectives*

From a policy perspective, the Food Estate policy aims to improve national food security through large-scale production based on farmer corporations, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic. However, this goal has not been properly communicated and socialized with local communities (Indonesia, 2022). However, the policy has created problems. First, ambiguity. The policy's objectives are too general (e.g., "agricultural modernization") without concrete indicators such as increasing farmer incomes or ecological sustainability. Furthermore, there are no quantitative targets such as increasing production per hectare or reducing onion imports by X%. Furthermore, there are no qualitative indicators such as empowering farmers through share ownership in corporations or strengthening customary institutions. This results in the policy being too flexible to be interpreted by different actors and triggering irregularities, such as corporations acquiring land in the name of "modernization." (Interview with Village Head).

Second, conflicting objectives. The policy prioritizes corporate interests (as off-takers) over farmer sovereignty, as evidenced by the allocation of land to companies like Indofood and BISI. This is evident in the multiple actors involved, each with a different objective. The central government's goal is to increase food production for national stocks (as evidenced by its focus on readily marketable commodities like onions and potatoes). Meanwhile, the corporation's goal is to profit by controlling the supply chain through a closed-loop system where farmers rely on corporate inputs and marketing. On the other hand, local farmers aim to maintain their land and traditional commodities like coffee, andaliman, and frankincense, which are more ecologically and culturally adaptive. The impact of this conflicting goal is that policies fail to reconcile the interests of each actor, resulting in farmers becoming victims ("depeasantization") (Indonesia, 2022). Conflicting policies arise: on the one hand, Food Law No. 18/2012 emphasizes "food diversity based on local resources" (Article 12). On the other hand, the Food Estate enforces monocultures of industrial commodities that are incompatible with the local ecosystem (e.g., shallots on former customary forest land). This policy violates the principle of policy coherence, creating dysfunction.

Third, there is a mismatch with the local context. The specified commodities (onions and potatoes) do not align with local agricultural traditions. (coffee, vegetables, andaliman). This is evident in the customary forest management system used by the Humbang Hasundutan indigenous community, known as the haminjon spear, which has persisted for generations. Even when the Food Estate project failed to integrate this cultural knowledge and converted 2,051 hectares of customary forest without consulting others, the Food Estate project ignored this information without consultation (Indonesia, 2022). Local farmers are accustomed to growing coffee and vegetables for diversification, which reduces the risk of crop failure. The Food Estate policy requires monocultures of onions and potatoes, which are vulnerable to pests and price fluctuations. This has led many farmers to refuse to participate or abandon the project after experiencing losses.

The final issue is the absence of an evaluation and transparency mechanism. This policy lacks an evaluation and accountability mechanism, as demonstrated by the project's failure to establish a monitoring mechanism that has social impacts, including changes in farmers' incomes. According to a report from the Indonesian House of Representatives (Qodriyatun, 2024), the land in the Food Estate in North Sumatra has experienced declining fertility for two years, but no action has been taken to correct it. According to Van Meter and Van Horn's theory, the allocation of and the availability of resources (financial, human, infrastructure, and information) are crucial for successful policy implementation. In the Food Estate project in Ria-Ria Village, resource allocation actually led to inequality and failure.

### *Resources*

According to Van Meter and Van Horn's theory, the allocation and availability of resources (financial, human, infrastructure, and information) are crucial for successful policy implementation. In the Food Estate project in Ria-Ria Village, resource allocation actually led to inequality and failure. One of the problems with financial resources is the unequal allocation and potential for corruption. This phenomenon can be seen in the large but minimal budget allocated to farmers. For example, in North Sumatra, a budget of IDR 1.062 trillion was allocated for the Food Estate project for infrastructure such as irrigation and roads (Alexander, 2020), but farmers complained that partner corporations such as Indofood and BISI, which received subsidies for land clearing and technology, enjoyed more of the funds, as did project contractors linked to local politicians (Qodriyatun, 2024). Furthermore, there is a lack of transparency in the use of funds, with the absence of a public audit mechanism or regular reports on budget absorption, which raises indications of irregularities, such as the purchase of agricultural equipment such as tractors at above-market prices, but not optimally utilized due to minimal training. Funds for "farmer assistance" that should have been for training were instead absorbed by external consultants. Ultimately, this impacts farmers, who receive no profits, while corporations increasingly strengthen their control over the production chain. (KSPPM, 2023)

Then there are human resource issues, evident in the low capacity and empowerment of farmers. Although this policy claims to "empower farmers," farmers are merely laborers paid daily wages (Rp 50,000–70,000/day), without ownership rights to land or crops. Furthermore, there are no long-term capacity-building programs, such as legal contracts from the Food Estate and agribusiness management training. (KSPPM, 2023). Another problem is the minimal role of agricultural extension workers. Agricultural extension workers (PP) at the Ministry of Agriculture only concentrate on technical outreach, such as how to plant onions, but they do not teach farmers legal knowledge, such as rights under contract agreements, or the ability to negotiate prices with corporations. This results in farmers being trapped in a dependency syndrome with corporations. (KSPPM, 2025).

Infrastructure resources also face problems, as evidenced by non-inclusive modernization, resulting in uneven irrigation and technology distribution. Infrastructure such as drip irrigation networks and storage warehouses are lacking on independent farmers' lands, as seen in Ria-Ria Village, where farmers not partnered with the Food Estate still rely on rainfall to irrigate their coffee plantations. Furthermore, existing technology is not adaptive, and farmers lack adequate training in using modern agricultural equipment such as tractors and monitoring drones. (KSPPM, 2023)

### *Interorganizational Communication*

According to Van Meter and Van Horn's theory, successful policy implementation relies heavily on communication and coordination between organizations. However, in this Food Estate case study, this project in Humbang Hasundutan actually led to conflict and failure. The problem that emerged was governance fragmentation, manifested in a multi-actor conflict without effective coordination. Several key actors were involved, including the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment, the Regional Government, corporations, civil society, and financial institutions. The central government and the Humbang Hasundutan Regency government created a problem, namely overlapping authority. The project, which was initially initiated by the Ministry of Agriculture in 2020, was then transferred to the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs in 2021. There was no clear socialization of the project, resulting in overlapping authority, which left farmers confused when they encountered contractual issues. They were only provided with ex-post information through formal socialization without any room for negotiation. (KSPPM, 2025).

There is a pseudo-participation through ceremonial outreach and dialogue, but farmers are forced to sign contracts without a full understanding of the clauses, and no copies of the documents are even provided to them. Furthermore, this is a top-down policy issue, where decisions about land and commodity

distribution are made by the central government without consulting the local government, farmers, and local indigenous communities. Only after the permit was issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry did the Humbang Hasundutan district government receive notification of the conversion of customary forest. Furthermore, there are problems with the dominance of communication channels carried out by corporations. While farmers must go through a multi-tiered bureaucracy, companies like Indofood have direct access to the minister. Corporations also attend 85% of coordination meetings. This top-down communication demonstrates a knowledge regime in which the state and corporations dictate what is "right" (e.g., corporations = modernization), while local knowledge, which embodies traditional planting patterns, is rendered useless.

#### *Characteristics of Implementation Agents*

In this variable, the Food Estate also faces obstacles such as a centralized and unresponsive bureaucracy. The bureaucracy has a rigid and hierarchical structure. A top-down approach without local adaptation is implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs, as the main sectors. For example, even though land is agronomically unsuitable, farmers are still required to plant commodities specified by the central government, such as onions or potatoes. No follow-up action is taken by the central government on field reports from the District Agriculture Office regarding crop failures. Furthermore, a bureaucratic culture of obedience to orders from higher-ups exists. Despite problems in the field, the local government (the Humbang Hasundutan Agriculture Office) does not dare challenge central government policies because it relies on central funding and political pressure from Jakarta to achieve the project's physical objectives. Another problem is the emergence of conflicts of interest within the institution, manifested by the Ministry of Agriculture's dual role. The Ministry of Agriculture does not maintain a neutral stance as both regulator and implementer of the project. This is evident in Ministry officials serving as commissioners in Food Estate partner companies (Indofood), and corporations conducting more policy socialization than the government. (Indonesia, 2022)

Furthermore, limited technical capacity is due to weak resource capacity. Agricultural extension workers lacked understanding of how to grow new commodities, such as onions and potatoes. Consequently, they failed to assist farmers and provided risk management training on how to manage price fluctuations. In Ria-ria Village, farmer groups were forced into "farmer corporations" with no financial management and cooperatives formed only symbolically for project administration (Lubis, 2022). Another problem was the erosion of official neutrality, with the sub-district head and village head losing their role as conflict mediators, replaced by the "Food Estate Acceleration Team." Furthermore, due to pressure from the regent, the local police refused to take action against corporations that violated their contracts.

#### *Economic, Social and Political Conditions*

The fifth variable in Van Meter and Van Horn's policy implementation theory is social, economic, and political conditions. Economically, there is polarization in access to economic resources, leading to the marginalization of farmers and structural dependency. 78% of the productive land in the Food Estate is owned by corporations (KSPPM, 2023), while farmers only rent the land with a profit share of between 30 and 70 percent. For example, onion sellers buy onions from farmers at IDR 8,000/kg, even though the market price is IDR 15,000/kg. Farmers subsequently lose alternative livelihoods, such as traditional sources of income (andaliman and frankincense), which are then eliminated due to the conversion of customary forests and coffee plantations. This has resulted in reduced incomes for 62% of Ria-Ria farming households (Indonesia, 2022). Furthermore, agricultural input inflation has occurred. Due to the distribution chain being controlled by project partner corporations, the price of subsidized fertilizer has increased by 300% since 2020. This forces farmers to incur debts to middlemen with 20% monthly interest. Then, on the social front, community disintegration and collective resistance occurred. One example is a change in social structure, with landowners becoming daily laborers on their own land for a wage of Rp 70,000 per day. According to data from the Humbang Hasundutan Regency Government, approximately 89% of young farmers (18-35 years old) choose to migrate to Malaysia (Humbang Hasundutan Regency Government, 2023). Furthermore, there has been an erosion of traditional institutions, such as the disappearance of the "Tombak Haminjon" tradition. Because 51% of customary forests were converted, the Tombak Haminjon system (communal forest management) collapsed and was abandoned by local communities. Consequently, conflicts emerged, leading to seven cases of violence against indigenous people by authorities during protests against land conversion.

Politically, the Food Estate project was used as a tool to legitimize national politics. Following the failure of previous food policies, such as onion imports in 2021, the project was deliberately packaged as a "food security solution." This imagery was seen as a government ploy to communicate politically for electoral gain. This is demonstrated by the fact that ministerial working visits to project sites are consistently covered by

the media, such as Luhut Panjaitan's 12 visits in 2020–2023, and the "rural development" narrative is used to gain farmer votes in the 2024 elections. This is supported by data obtained from the National Elections Commission (KSPPM), which shows that the majority of farmers in North Sumatra believe this project is only being implemented to support the government's campaign (Interview with the KSPPM). In local politics, the criminalization of resistance movements is occurring. This reflects a repressive attitude using legal politics. Article 107 of the Job Creation Law concerning "investment obstacles" is being used to criminalize farmers, and the ITE Law prevents criticism on social media (12 KSPPM activists have been reported since 2021). Furthermore, there is militarization of conflicts, such as the appointment of Babinsa (Village Guidance Officers) as "project support teams" and three cases of violence perpetrated by authorities against project opponents (LBH Medan, 2022).

Regarding gender, the presence of the Food Estate will impact women's roles in agriculture. As mentioned, women in Riaria control the rice fields, while men are in the forests. Women are responsible for managing the staple food source, rice, and are generally considered household treasurers; in other words, they are responsible for managing household income and expenses. Although women are considered to have control over the rice fields, both men and women work equally in rice cultivation. In Riaria, women work from fertilization, planting, maintenance, and harvesting to soil preparation (hoeing). The allocation of labor among Food Estate farmers was divided when the Food Estate planting season began in December 2020, coinciding with the rice planting season. When the first rice harvest began, most of the women Food Estate farmers finally began working on the Food Estate land. This resulted in a shortage of work in the rice fields.

#### 4. CONCLUSION

The Food Estate policy in Riaria Village, Humbang Hasundutan Regency, North Sumatra, is implemented with a top-down and centralized approach, often ignoring the participation and needs of farmers and local communities. Although the project aims to improve national food security, its implementation will negatively impact the social, economic, and political aspects of local farming communities. The Food Estate policy in Riaria Village is implemented with a top-down approach, meaning the central government and corporations dominate the decision-making process without meaningfully involving local community participation. The community and the village head of Riaria are not involved in discussions or decision-making throughout the planning and implementation process. Farmers do not understand the project's objectives and mechanisms due to rushed socialization and a lack of instruction on new horticultural planting patterns.

The policy also fails to consider local social, cultural, and ecological conditions, such as local agricultural traditions (Tombak Haminjon) and farmer knowledge. This results in a misalignment between the policy and the community's actual needs and generates resistance from farmers and the community. This policy has resulted in the replacement of traditional agricultural commodities, such as andaliman, frankincense, coffee, and vegetables, with horticultural crops, such as shallots and potatoes, which are incompatible with local agricultural practices. The shift in cropping patterns from rice to non-staple food commodities can also diminish women's role in maintaining household food security. The Food Estate project policy has social, economic, and political impacts. Conventional social structures, such as gender roles in agriculture and customary institutions, are being undermined by this policy. Women lose their dominance in rice field management, and the younger generation chooses to migrate because the project does not provide any benefits. Farmers suffer losses due to crop failure, debt bondage, and dependence on corporations. Local commodities such as andaliman and frankincense are neglected, while new crops like onions and potatoes are not adapted to the geographical conditions.

The project is being used as a tool for political legitimacy by national and local elites, at the expense of farmers' interests. Agrarian conflicts and the criminalization of those who oppose the project exacerbate injustice. This project indicates a power gap between farmers and the government, potentially leading to the proletarianization of farmers and the loss of small-scale farmers (depeasantization). The government tends to rely more on corporations than on farmers, who are merely empowered as "production machines" without being involved in decision-making. Furthermore, community misunderstanding of land legality leads to horizontal conflict and the trap of bank debt for capital. Using Van Meter and Van Horn's theory, the analysis reveals several factors contributing to the failure of policy implementation. These include unclear and non-adaptive policy standards, non-transparent and uneven resource allocation, corporate co-optation and poor inter-agency communication, and implementers' disposition torn between obedience to superiors and empathy for farmers. By diverting fertile land for commercial farming purposes, the Food Estate policy puts local food security at risk. The principles of food sovereignty (Nyéléni Declaration) and

human rights contradict the fact that farmers lose control over food production and their land. Overall, the implementation of the Food Estate in Riaria Village demonstrates a policy pattern that ignores local wisdom and community participation, thus negatively impacting the social, economic, and political conditions of farmers. Ultimately, this will pose a threat to local food sovereignty.

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